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Abstract: 
 
Blockchain technologies enable new forms of data sharing in platforms. This raises 
questions around how they are jointly developed and managed in blockchain consortia 
and what role public agencies play in those efforts. Based on an analysis of prior work 
 
1 The final publication is available at IOS Press through http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3233/IP-190147 
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on data sharing in public-private partnerships and other blockchain projects, we analyze 
the case of the Cardossier. The Cardossier project and (later) association develops a 
platform to link the public and private actors in the Swiss car ecosystem. The 
participating car registration authority has the roles of an actor in interorganizational 
processes, supplier of data, source of trust, guarantor of data quality, user of data, and 
incentive for making goods public. We conclude that the public agencies have a very 
important role in blockchain consortia and propose that they should use this role 
actively as part of their efforts to create public value. 
 
Key points for practitioners: 
• Blockchain platforms enable new forms of data sharing between public and private 
organizations. These platforms are typically created by consortia facing governance 
issues.  
• Public agencies play an important role in those platforms as an actor in 
interorganizational processes, supplier of data, source of trust, guarantor of data 
quality, user of data, and incentive for making goods public. 
• The car ecosystem is a promising area for creating blockchain platforms. 
 
Keywords: blockchain platform, blockchain consortium, blockchain governance, public-
private partnerships, data collaboratives, car ecosystem, road traffic authority  
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1 Introduction  
Blockchain technologies have moved on beyond cryptocurrencies. An increasing 
number of organizations experiment with how to make best use of blockchain 
technologies for improving their collaboration and joint value generation. They team up 
in 'blockchain consortia', trying out what is possible to achieve together. There have 
been efforts to reorganize land-registers (Themistocleous 2018), public health (Gordon 
& Catalini 2018), student certificates (Gräther et al. 2018), and the used car market 
(Notheisen et al. 2017). One important common feature of those blockchain consortia 
appears to be the prominent role of public agencies. While this is obvious in cases, 
where public registers are replaced or augmented, it is less obvious in other cases, e.g. 
in the used car market. So, what exactly is the role of public agencies in blockchain 
consortia? Are they key players or just "nice-to-have"? How does the presence of public 
agencies influence the governance of blockchain consortia? 
 
This paper will explore the role of public agencies using the case of the Cardossier 
project. The Cardossier project strives to improve the Swiss car ecosystem by storing 
and sharing data from the life cycle of a car (import, registration, repair, insurance, 
accidents, driving behavior, etc.) in a blockchain. The authors have engaged as scholars 
(Mathiassen & Nielsen 2008) in this undertaking and report from a rich basis of data and 
experiences. The case description and the subsequent analysis will be useful for setting 
up and governing blockchain consortia that develop platforms for the used car market 
and beyond. It will inform public agencies’ choices regarding the opportunities and 
challenges of blockchain-based collaborative value generation when entering 
blockchain consortia (Bauer et al. 2019). It should also educate blockchain startups and 
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help them understand what it means to collaborate with public agencies. Researchers 
will gain insights into a fascinating new topic: Blockchain governance in the presence of 
public agencies. We call for revisiting the literature on public-private partnerships in 
light of the new technological opportunities.  
 
This paper will first introduce related work. In doing so, we will briefly review the 
literature on public-private partnerships and data collaboratives, on blockchain 
technologies, and on blockchain consortia; we will then turn to the literature for case 
descriptions for blockchain consortia that involve public agencies. The second section 
will present the methodology and the data collection. In the third section, we will 
describe the Cardossier case as it evolved over time, with a particular focus on the role 
of the car registration authority. The case will then be discussed in the light of prior 
knowledge of the role of public agencies. Conclusions and limitations will finish the 
paper.  
2 Public Agencies in Blockchain Consortia 
2.1 Public-private Partnerships and Data Cooperatives 
The Bible offers the first evidence of public private partnerships, for the purpose of 
collecting taxes’ (Hodge & Greve 2007).  Most recent public private partnerships 
projects address infrastructure such as highways or power networks (Hughes 1993), but 
there is also a history of public-private Partnerships for information systems. In public-
private Partnerships, public agencies enter into long-term relationships with private 
organizations based on an incomplete contract (Hart 2003). In infrastructure projects, 
the main driver is sharing the financial burden of an investment, either because funds 
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are limited or because lower costs increase its political acceptance. The incomplete 
contract triggers the need for some organizational arrangement, which can assume a 
tight or loose form (Hodge & Greve 2007). Infrastructure projects also dominate the 
debate in the IT-sector, e.g., building up a high-speed-internet infrastructure and 
general initiatives to advance digitalization and digital skills in an economy. The 
incomplete contracts frequently lead to frustrations that are best summarized by Dieter 
Klumpp, condensing his decades of experience in PPP as head of the Alcatel Lucent 
Foundation in the sentence: "Oh, I thought YOU would pay!" (personal conversation).  
 
In recent years, a new form of PPP has arisen around the notion of sharing data: Public 
and private agencies create platforms to exchange or share data. Government agencies 
may engage in those platforms just to improve operational efficiencies. Or they engage 
with private organizations in 'data collaboratives' (Klievink et al. 2018; Verhulst & 
Sangokoya 2015) or 'data driven social partnerships' (Susha et al. 2018) to jointly create 
value, typically in a collaborative innovation addressing a societal challenge. Or they 
invest in shared platforms to transform the government 'outside-in' (Klievink et al. 
2016). In all cases there are differences of interests and tensions between participating 
organizations, and therefore there is a need for a network governance (Klievink et al. 
2018). Decision rights and rules are needed to steer the whole platform while leaving 
sufficient autonomy to the actors to create value for their own purposes. Ownership 
over platforms must be established and if it is a shared platform, neutrality needs to be 
assured. Typically, the platform offers access to shared data as incentive to participate. 
This can lead to very mundane benefits, such as less burdensome reporting (Klievink et 
al. 2016), joint supply chain management (Klievink et al. 2016), or even joint innovation 
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(Klievink et al. 2018). It is particularly important to incentivize the data providers (Susha 
et al. 2018). Here, typical reimbursement mechanisms are currently still based on barter, 
e.g., the government agencies can provide aggregated analysis in return for access to 
the primary data from private organizations (Klievink et al. 2016). There are further 
issues for consortia engaged in such partnerships (Susha et al. 2018) in the areas of 
regulation (e.g., lack of consistent and comprehensive legal provisions), organization 
(e.g., difficulties in collaboration, lack of finance or lack of trust), data (e.g., data privacy, 
data security and data quality), and society (e.g., institutional and political power shifts). 
 
Sharing a data platform frequently leads to conflicts between private partners. Here, 
government agencies may serve as a neutral actor to create a fair environment and 
facilitate conflict resolution (Susha et al. 2018). On the other hand, public agencies have 
to guarantee public interests and are a substantial provider of data. This triple role as 
neutral actor, guarantor of public interest, and data provider frequently gives public 
agencies a leading role in collaboratives (Klievink et al. 2018). Thus, there is ample 
literature on opportunities and challenges in private public partnerships where partners 
team up to create physical infrastructures. There have been some efforts to transfer and 
instantiate these insights to data infrastructures. However, these efforts came before 
the advent of blockchain platforms. Does the opportunity to assure distributed trust 
(Auinger & Riedl 2018) and exchange value digitally (Truong et al. 2018) offer new 
opportunities and pose new challenges?  
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2.2 Blockchain, Blockchain Platforms and Blockchain Consortia 
From a user perspective, blockchain technologies provide a shared database with some 
unique features. The database is implemented as a distributed ledger which allows 
decentralized control over data items and the database as a whole (Ølnes et al. 2017). 
Due to cryptographic algorithms, the data entries are (almost) immutable. This allows 
unique data items in a distributed setting. These unique data items can be used to 
authenticate transactions (e.g., a land transfer transaction using a distributed land 
registration ledger (Themistocleous 2018)). These transactions can be conducted 
without the need for trusted intermediaries (Tapscott & Tapscott 2016) and may 
ultimately lead to a more distributed government and governance (Ølnes et al. 2017). 
Blockchain technologies also introduce 'digital scarcity' (Miscione et al. 2018). The initial 
use case for digital scarcity is digital money: digital bills only have value if they cannot 
be copied. Now, there are a range of other use cases for storing value (Tapscott & 
Tapscott 2016), including titles of ownership or usage rights (e.g., of electricity (Albrecht 
et al. 2018)). Blockchain technologies have rapidly evolved from data storage (first 
generation) to blockchains that are programmable with "smart contracts" (second 
generation), to advanced distributed ledgers, forfeiting immutability solely guaranteed 
by technology in exchange for better performance and scalability as well as reduced 
electricity consumption. These distributed ledgers are frequently 'permissioned', i.e., 
they are not accessible to the anonymous public anymore but rather require 
identification of the users. Use of such permissioned blockchains is a prerequisite to 
place the systems under the rule of law, i.e., to allow the platform providers to use the 
legal system, run the platform, and to force the platform providers to stay within the 
limits of legal regulations.  
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Blockchain platforms are an important application area of blockchain technologies. On 
these platforms, different actors meet to exchange information and value (Kenney & 
Zysman 2016). Since the rise of Google, Amazon, and Facebook, platform ownership has 
proven to be a source of tremendous economic and social power. Blockchain platforms 
can be used to distribute this power amongst all participants: Participants can all keep 
ownership of the data they provide and decentrally authenticate transactions among 
them. Furthermore, they have the capability to store and distribute value digitally. This 
allows the management of digital assets (digital money, titles, etc.) and the use of digital 
"tokens" (Oliveira et al. 2018) to incentivize a desired behavior. For example, the Steem 
social media platform offers Steem tokens in exchange for the contribution of useful 
content (Ciriello et al. 2018). Blockchain platforms require the active participation of 
diverse actors of the ecosystem and are therefore frequently created by 'blockchain 
consortia' instead of being created by startup companies. Blockchain consortia operate 
in a similar manner to consortia creating physical infrastructures or digital 
infrastructures (see above). However, they have the opportunity to use blockchain 
technologies not only for the delivery of the platform itself but also for organizing their 
collaboration and, most importantly, their governance (Beck et al. 2018, Ziolkowski et 
al. 2018). While the extreme form of a "distributed autonomous organization" run 
purely by smart contracts turned out to be an expensive illusion, specialized blockchain 
applications can automatically distribute tasks and support decision making by voting. 
The increased automation of governance requires more careful planning of blockchain 
consortia when compared to conventional consortia planning (Miscione et al. 2019). 
Furthermore, the automation of contracts and the transfer of values raise important 
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legal and regulatory questions, most fundamentally whether a 'smart contract' is a 
legally binding contract and whether there can really be ownership of data. 
 
The new capabilities of blockchain technologies in general, and blockchain platforms in 
particular, have attracted interest from public agencies and they have started 
experimenting with blockchains (Ølnes et all. 2017). They have joined a number of 
blockchain consortia asking themselves: Can blockchain platforms solve some of the 
problems public-private partnerships have been struggling with in the past?  
2.3 Public Agencies in Blockchain Consortia  
Experimentation with blockchain technologies has led to a series of small projects with 
the engagement of public agencies2. Land registries, Certification of University degrees, 
and Health records are the most prominent use cases. 
 
a) Land registries: Ghana, Sweden, Honduras, and Georgia have all experimented with 
placing land registries on the blockchain (Themistocleous 2018; Benbunan-Fich & 
Castellanos 2018). While in Western countries the case for blockchain-based registries 
focuses more on the operational efficiency of processes, the case for developing 
countries is more fundamental: In Ghana and Honduras, land registries have not been 
established like they have in developed countries, and the inhabitants do not trust the 
government. The resulting insecure land ownership seriously hampers their economic 
development. In addition, in Georgia the authorities are afraid of what would happen to 
 
2 An overview over the of projects of very active Dutch public administration can be found under 
https://www.blockchainpilots.nl 
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their land registers in case of occupation. In all cases, the blockchain consortia are 
dominated by the public agencies: They decide how the technology of the platform is 
further developed, they authenticate data, and they decide on who is entitled to 
membership of the consortium running the platform. Regular courts settle disputes of 
ownership or transactions. In all cases blockchain technologies are used to link the 
different partners to a shared platform and to authenticate central information. Most 
of the actual information is still stored in conventional databases because they perform 
better, because they store data far more cheaply, and because current blockchain 
technologies may be replaced by superior technologies in the near future.  Yet, due to 
the ability to store authenticated immutable records, land registries are among the most 
promising and farthest developed blockchain platforms. The first research reports on 
their governance have just being published (Miscione et al. 2018; Ziolkowski et al. 2019). 
 
b) Certification of University degrees: University degrees are important parts of citizens' 
CVs. Currently, they are only available in paper form, leading to both inefficient 
processes and frequent fraud. Thus, there have been efforts to create a distributed 
digital certification platform (Schmidt 2015; Gräther et al. 2018). While in the case of 
land registries one public agency could establish a clear leadership role, many 
universities have to collaborate to jointly create and run this platform. Furthermore, 
private organizations are also important stakeholders as they are the primary users of 
the certificates when hiring university graduates. Currently, there are ample proof of 
concept prototypes and pilots running, but none have yet reached the stage where a 
significant number of stakeholders are collaborating. Thus, it is too early to evaluate the 
role of public agencies in the consortia developing them.  
 11 
 
c) Health Records: The health ecosystem consists (at minimum) of patients, doctors, 
other healthcare professionals, pharmacies, hospitals, public regulators, and health 
insurers. Core to most digital transformation efforts is a digital patient record, 
containing the patient’s personal information and their health history. Lengthy disputes 
over who owns this patient record has significantly hampered the ecosystem-wide 
adoption of digital health records so far. Here, blockchain platforms offer the 
opportunity to distribute data ownership and access as well as platform decision 
making. There have been experiments addressing the interoperability, removing 
intermediaries, enabling more patient centric treatments and giving patients more 
control (Gordon & Catalini 2018) by a blockchain. Access to health data is granted 
liberally to qualified persons, but all such access to health data is tracked, so it can be 
challenged if necessary. Specific research on the role of the public agencies in this sector 
does not yet exist.  
 
Furthermore, blockchain platforms have been used to provide refugees with digital 
identities (Fridgen 2018), to distribute cash-based aid (Zwitter & Boisse-Despiaux 2018), 
and to improve the academic publishing process (Novotny et al. 2018). The case of the 
car ecosystem has also been addressed before, elaborating on use cases (Notheisen et 
al. 2017), addressing privacy-preserving IOT data collection (Chanson et al. 2019), 
discussing opportunities for business models (Bauer et al. 2019), analyzing the incentive 
systems (Zavolokina et al. 2018), selecting appropriate tokens (Oliveira et al. 2018), 
designing a data market (Bauer et al. 2019), and addressing trust issues (Zavolokina 
2019). However, none of these publications have addressed the governance of 
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blockchain consortia and the role of the public sector. There is furthermore a continuous 
stream of announcements and whitepapers from industry (e.g. from Hyundai3) or the 
public sector (e.g. the government of Bahrain4 and the city of Seoul5), but again without 
an in-depth discussion of the role of the public sector and blockchain governance. 
 
In summary, we conclude from this literature review that there is ample literature on 
general public-private data sharing through platforms. It typically focuses on 'public 
value' use cases and provides important insights on the regulatory, organizational, data 
handling, and social issues of data sharing. Are those insights applicable to blockchain 
consortia and do they sufficiently describe them? Reports on blockchain consortia and 
platform development are so scarce, that it is worthy of further exploration. 
3 Methodology and Data Collection  
The Cardossier Project followed the approach of solution-based probing (Briggs et al. 
2019), i.e., the idea for a technological solution is the starting point. In a continuous 
process of developing and testing (partial) solutions, both an understanding of the 
problems and the potential for technology to create a solution develops. In many ways, 
solution-based probing is a subclass of action design research (Sein et al. 2011): 
Research switches between phases of engagement and reflection. Engagement phases 
 
3 https://medium.com/aergo/hyundai-autoever-presents-blockchain-based-used-car-trading-service-at-
posco-tower-mentions-aergo-1f485521325 
4 https://www.coinwelt.de/2018/05/bahrain-registrierung-von-autos-mit-der-blockchain/ 
5 https://news.itu.int/seoul-blockchain/ 
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cover not only organizational work, but also the design of prototypes. And this project 
covers the last research mile (Nunamaker et al. 2015), going from proof-of-concept 
research over proof-of-value research to proof-of-use research. 
 
Data on the Cardossier was collected on different occasions. As part of an in-depth 
stakeholder and business analysis, the role the car registration authority plays in the 
ecosystem was explored in several interviews and workshops. Theses interviews were 
transcribed and coded using MAXQDA. Researchers analyzed the processes and the data 
flows between the car registration authority and other partners in the car ecosystem. 
The most important insights were gained through the ongoing discussions in the 
triweekly project meetings and the quarterly steering committee meetings. Minutes 
were taken at the steering committee meetings, but it was not possible to systematically 
capture all relevant discussions. Therefore, we conducted a post-hoc validation of the 
reported results, during which involved the actors (the project manager, the manager in 
charge from the car registration authority, and three participants from the project team) 
checked the described results and subsequent discussion for correctness.   
4 Results 
4.1 Introduction to the Cardossier Project 
The Cardossier project aims to improve the Swiss car ecosystem by storing car usage 
data in a blockchain. There are three major areas for improvement (Bauer et al. 2019):  
1. New product offerings, like documented car histories, could potentially increase the 
transparency of the used car market and thus increase the value of cars in the 
"market for lemons" (Akerlof 1978), 
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2. Digitization of processes between the actors in the car ecosystem could increase its 
operational excellence, and 
3.  Better customized products and services could be based on Cardossier Data (e.g., 
new insurance products or peer-to-peer car lending).  
This requires storing the history of car usage starting with the import and ending with 
the wrecking of the car. In between, all major events need to be covered, e.g., 
registrations, repairs or inspections, insurance contracts, accidents, changes of 
ownership or obligatory car inspections by the registration authorities. Modern cars 
provide interfaces to extract more fine-grained technical data on car usage, e.g., how 
the car was accelerated or how the brakes where used. This can be aggregated to usage 
profiles indicating whether the car has been mostly driven in cities, in rural areas or on 
highways and what kind of a driver the owner was. 
 
Owning a platform and collecting all this data is the dream of any stakeholder in the car 
ecosystem (particularly the car manufacturers) and many startup companies. However, 
the experiences with other such platforms, such as Facebook, Google, Amazon, and 
Uber, has warned the participants to never allow this concentration of power to happen 
in the car ecosystem. Most importantly, car insurance companies have warned that in 
any case of an accident involving a self-driving car, the car’s manufacturer should not 
control the data that is critical to judging their level of responsibility. As public 
authorities are also not suited to running such a platform, a centralized solution is not 
an option, and a joint effort is the only option. Blockchain technologies offer the 
opportunity to jointly create and operate a distributed, but shared, platform for trusted 
car data in a more sophisticated manner than with traditional IT.  
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4.2 The Consortium Forming Phase 
The Cardossier idea was conceived by the University of Zurich and AdNovum Informatik 
AG, a medium-sized software engineering company in Zurich, Switzerland. Both partners 
aimed to explore the technical and business potential of blockchain technologies. Once 
they had settled on the use case of the Cardossier, they focused on creating a 
consortium with all major players in the car ecosystem on board. These were a large car 
importer, a car retailer, a repair shop (all roles fulfilled by AMAG, the largest Swiss car 
importer and retailer) and a large insurance company (AXA Winterthur, the largest Swiss 
car insurer). Mobility, the largest Swiss car sharing company joined, promising to deliver 
detailed car usage data for their cars. In addition, the car registration authority of the 
Swiss canton of Aargau joined (informally, for legal reasons). They are responsible both 
for registering cars after each change of ownership, passing on registration data to the 
tax authorities and for the mandatory inspection of cars every couple of years. They own 
important data and participate in key processes all partners are interested in, such as 
registering a car. Furthermore, they are a source of trust for car owners and other actors 
of the car ecosystem. Last, but not least, the University of Applied Sciences in Luzern 
joined, contributing their expertise in data protection. The consortium agreed on a 
project proposal, an agile development approach and project governance with formal 
roles for project leadership, scientific leadership, and a steering committee typical for IT 
innovation projects. The project was supported by a grant from Innosuisse, the Swiss 
Innovation Agency.  
4.3 The Exploration Phase 
The first year of the Cardossier project was characterized by exploration. The technical 
exploration activities focused on building a generic distributed platform for data capture 
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and distribution, supporting a few basic use cases (particularly the sale of a car). Early 
on, it was decided to base the Cardossier platform on a permissioned blockchain. After 
nine months, the basic platform had to be moved from the Hyperledger blockchain 
platform to the Corda Distributed Ledger, because Corda provided better scalability and 
data protection (while giving up some key features of traditional blockchains). User 
requirements where validated with the Cardossier game simulating a used car market 
platform, and exploratory studies on user preferences and trust were conducted.  
 
It was clear from the beginning of the project that setting up appropriate governance 
was a key challenge for the Cardossier project. Any permissioned blockchain has to 
function within a given legal system - in this case, the Swiss legal system. Thus, the future 
Cardossier consortium had to become a legal entity, be it a stock corporation, a 
cooperative or an association. All possible models were explored in great detail. Within 
the models, we checked for the applicability of blockchain-based decision models, based 
on voting and smart contracts. Decisions ranged from funding of development efforts 
to decisions on the business model (see below), and to entering and leaving the 
consortium.  
 
As the initial funding lasted for only 18 months, crafting an appropriate business model 
for the time afterwards was paramount (Bauer et al. 2019). How could a platform 
benefit from the increased car value? How could it benefit from the efficiency gains of 
inter-organizational digital processes? And how could it benefit from new products 
enabled by Cardossier data? For all three questions, an answer was to be found in the 
creation of a data market. A data market can greatly benefit from blockchain, as data 
 17 
ownership is clear (within the limits of current law) for any given time. Thus, a business 
model could be to create and provide a comprehensive Cardossier for each car sale 
transaction and charge either the seller or the buyer a fee for using it. The platform 
could also tax any transfer of data between partners, be it for operational purposes or 
for new products. In Switzerland, such a data market is only acceptable if the car owners 
have a say on the release of their private data under a self-sovereign identity scheme 
(Abraham 2017).  
 
A Cardossier data market only works, if the data is of sufficient quality (i.e., correct, up 
to date and complete (Zavolokina et al. 2018)). Initially, the car importer can guarantee 
data quality. But once a car is sold and thus released into the wild, data quality depends 
on many actors and not all may be reliable. While it is in the interests of all actors to 
include sales transactions, insurance details and records of mandatory inspections into 
each Cardossier, accidents may be a different story. Any serious accident decreases the 
value of a car significantly and thus there is an incentive for a car owner to bribe a repair 
shop into repairing the car without an entry into Cardossier. The blockchain provides a 
first safeguard as it can prove at any later time what events, such as accidents, were 
reported in relation to a particular car at any given time. So, a buyer can later prove that 
an accident has not been reported to him. Reputation mechanisms for car repair shops 
and other actors in the ecosystem and a whistleblower mechanism may provide an 
incentive to all stakeholders to provide complete and correct data (Zavolokina et al. 
2018). Some data fraud may also be prevented by insurance companies insisting on an 
entry into the Cardossier by participating car owners. However, the most important 
incentive can be provided by the car registration authorities: Currently, Swiss car 
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registration authorities do not only register cars, but also perform mandatory 
inspections in their workshops. It is clear that with the increasing digitalization of cars 
and the move towards electric cars, the authorities have less to inspect: The mechanics 
of electric cars are simpler, and the authorities do not have the means to inspect 
software that is specific to each brand. So, their traditional business model is likely to be 
obsolete in the coming years. In the future, they will have to rely on data provided by 
the car itself and by data provided by other actors in the ecosystem. A complete, correct 
and up-to-date Cardossier will allow for a digital checkup most of the time. If the car 
registration authorities go this way, they will insist on a Cardossier that is complete for 
all data they need. And as a state agency, they can provide a strong incentive as 
incomplete data may be considered as fraud.  
 
A last stream of exploration addressed possible use cases for 'CarCoins' (i.e., digital 
tokens representing something of value (Oliveira et al. 2018)). Should a CarCoin 
represent a car? Should CarCoins be used for paying for data (allowing for paying even 
fractions of a cent) and internal taxation in the data market? Should CarCoins be 
generated to pay for validation (by 'notary nodes' in Corda) and generally running the 
platform? Should they give voting power in a Cardossier platform? Should they provide 
an incentive for data provision to the platform? Or should CarCoins represent shares of 
a future cooperation (or similar construction)? This exploration phase culminated in 
different options for continuing the Cardossier project: Should it aggressively ride the 
Initial Coin Offering wave like most other projects addressing the car ecosystems at that 
time (most of these projects disappeared after a year)? This would transform the 
consortium into a company and could raise a double-digit million-dollar amount of initial 
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funding, assuring the operations for the Cardossier for several years. Or should it 
continue on its path as a consortium providing a shared platform?  
  
4.4 Preparing Market Entry: The Consolidation and Ramp-up Phase 
The consolidation phase started in Autumn 2018 and it was about making choices. The 
consortium forfeited the opportunity to raise money in an ICO and rather decided to 
found a non-profit association open to all Swiss stakeholders (including car owners). A 
senior manager from the Aargau car registration authority took over the task of 
founding the association and was elected president of the Cardossier Association. Six 
further Swiss companies, including a major financial service provider, joined the 
association in March 2019 and contributed their share for the development efforts until 
the Go-live in 2020.  
 
The decision to hand over the presidency to the car registration authority was grounded 
in the nature of the Cardossier platform. The platform is a network product and it is only 
valuable if it covers a large part of the Swiss car ecosystem; in many senses it thus 
resembles a network product. The car registration authorities are an indispensable part 
of this ecosystem: They not only participate in core processes, but also provide access 
to other public agencies, influence regulations and are widely trusted by Swiss citizens. 
But this trust comes with a 'cost': According to the Swiss understanding of the role of 
government, they should only participate in the ecosystem if the platform is non-profit 
and open to all Swiss stakeholders. This basic setup limits the options for governance 
and a data market. It is still possible to automate some decision making through voting 
and smart contracts and it also allows for some tokens. However, regarding tokens the 
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regulation in Switzerland is still in flux and banks entering the consortium will push the 
topic ahead.  
 
The Cardossier Association governs and develops the basic Cardossier platform and the 
data exchange between partners. As typical for modern platforms, the Cardossier is split 
into a core and extensions. The core covers the basic business logic for the Cardossier 
platform and the data market, like access and permission rights. It also structures how 
the different stakeholders interact with each other and are governed in this shared 
network: Last, but not least it provides infrastructure and logic for data market. On top 
of the core platform there are DApps ("Decentralized Applications" following the 
example of Ethereum6) for the individual use cases such as a car import, fleet 
management, or car sales. These DApps will be developed by subgroups of the 
association and they can be for-profit. Thus, the Cardossier Association provides a 
blockchain-based multi-sided platform, connecting the major private and public players 
in the car ecosystem, software-companies, and private car-owners. 
 
The business case for all partners depends on the availability of sufficient data. Ramping 
up an initial data set of basic car data for a large fraction of Swiss cars is key to get all 
other activities running. On the one hand, this turned out to be surprisingly easy as the 
data exists with several stakeholders. On the other hand, data quality turned out to be 
an issue for many stakeholders, not least for the public agencies on a canton and federal 
level. Some fields (e.g., the initial purchase price) turned out to be wrong in up to 40 
 
6 https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/383/what-is-a-dapp 
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percent of all car records, because this information is entered manually by the actors 
based on unreliable sources (i.e., the car owner). So, members of the consortium do not 
only save the effort of manual data entry by exchanging data, but also have more 
accurate data if they receive it from reliable sources. However, understandably the 
sources of reliable data want to be rewarded for their efforts. Thus, the consortium 
currently aspires to design a data market that provides incentives, transparency and a 
fair exchange mechanism for different kinds of data products.  
5 Discussion  
Blockchain Consortia strive to improve collaborative value generation based on a 
shared, but distributed platform. They typically work within a 'society', i.e., they have to 
accept social norms, legal rules, and regulations. In these consortia there is a place for 
public agencies. So, what exactly is the role of public agencies in blockchain consortia? 
As we can see from the Cardossier case, they play an important role in 
interorganizational processes as a supplier of data, a source of trust, a guarantor of data 
quality, a user of data, and an incentive for making goods public.  
 
a) Actor in interorganizational processes: In a developed country, almost all 
interorganizational processes involve some public agency collecting tax, regulating 
activities, or providing its own services. In widespread high-value-high-risk areas, such 
as land ownership or car usage, the role of governments is particularly strong. They do 
not just oversee the actors but also get involved in the most important transactions 
themselves, e.g., property sales transactions or assuring roadworthiness of cars. In this 
role, they have a primary interest in efficient and effective (meaning digital) processes. 
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Blockchain technologies facilitate orchestrating those interorganizational processes 
without a powerful central private actor and also without state agencies transgressing 
their traditional boundaries of responsibilities. The Cardossier case furthermore shows 
the transformational power of shared distributed platforms (enabled by blockchain 
technologies) for government agencies. The car registration authorities are enabled to 
switch from a hands-on checking of cars to digital checking of car fitness. The hands-on 
inspection of vehicles is no longer required at a government agency level and can be 
delegated to private garages (and to the car manufacturers for software provision). So, 
it is not just 'transformation outside-in' of a public agency (Klievink et al. 2016) but 
'transformation inside-and-outside' in collaboration with private and public partners to 
jointly reshape an ecosystem.  
 
b) Supplier of data: Registries are primary candidates for blockchain applications: 
Persistent and unchanged records and transactions are at the heart of any register. As 
in other cases (e.g., land registers), existing registers are valuable hubs of trustworthy 
information. After all, only the government has a complete register of all Swiss cars 
allowed on the roads. This includes all safety-relevant parts that can be used in those 
cars (e.g., different sets of wheels). Setting up this harmonized central register has cost 
a double-digit million-dollar amount in Switzerland in recent years. The public agencies 
now have important transaction data on the registration and the mandatory inspection 
of cars that no other stakeholder can provide. Here, the Cardossier case is similar to the 
case of land registries in more developed countries (e.g., Themistocleous 2018, 
Ziolkowski et al. 2018). It just does not make sense to duplicate efforts if high quality 
registries already exist; however, it makes a lot of sense to "wrap" a blockchain "around" 
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the registries, allowing distributed access, and to collect additional data in this 
blockchain.  
 
c) Source of trust: Swiss citizens may not like the car registration authorities, but they 
trust them in several senses. They trust that a system supported by the authorities is not 
a passing fad, but there to stay; they trust that such a system at least fulfills the quality 
standard they are used to in other E-Government applications; and they trust that such 
a system complies to law and regulation. This trust is particularly important with such a 
hyped and little-understood new technology as blockchains. This observation is in line 
with reports from traditional data collaboratives (Klievink et al. 2018). In this case we 
can shed more light on what exactly is meant by trust here: It is institutional trust 
(Auinger &Riedl 2018) that is transferred to a platform. If there are no trustworthy 
institutions participating in a platform, it is difficult to launch it. In a similar vein, 
companies are more likely to join if public agencies commit to it. For private companies, 
the participation of relevant public agencies is a signal of its trustworthiness and its 
potential longevity. 
 
d) Guarantor of data quality: Data quality has been a major issue in traditional data 
collaboratives (Klievink et al. 2018). While blockchains have mechanisms to ensure that 
data is not changed after it has been entered, they cannot guarantee the quality of the 
data when it is initially entered. Here, other mechanisms have to be used: Government 
registries have specialized procedures and regulations to assure data quality. Thus, in 
many developed countries, blockchain systems can either import their data or use them 
as an external 'oracle' (Xu et al. 2016). This role as a trusted data source has been 
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primarily discussed in blockchain literature on land-registers (Themistocleous 2018; 
Ziolkowksi et al. 2018; Benbunan-Fich & Castellanos 2018), health (Gordon & Catalini 
2018), or in academic certification (Gräther et al. 2018). But the Cardossier case shows 
that the role of public agencies goes even further: Public agencies can use their power 
to insist on and enforce data quality in a blockchain if it relies on the blockchain-based 
data for its internal work. The immutability of data entries into blockchain platforms 
strengthens the ability to check whether data has been altered.  
 
e) User of data: The public sector has a lot of experience in collecting information it is 
legally required to receive. However, it is less experienced in exchanging digital data 
with other stakeholders in an ecosystem. Reasons for this are the limitations set by data 
protection laws, a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, and the limitations of sometimes 
outdated IT infrastructures and processes. The case of the Cardossier shows that public 
institutions, as a user of data, can benefit from a shared blockchain platform in three 
ways:  
1. They can use the platform to integrate with other stakeholders and receive more 
data of high quality. This is particularly the case if they are at the end of an 
information chain and have to rely on secondary data (in this case data provided 
to the public administration by the car owners instead of the car importers). 
2. A blockchain platform can be regarded as a distributed database with very fine-
granular access control and usage tracking. This allows both private partners and 
the public agencies to have much more detailed access to data and enables the 
exchange of data on a level that was not previously possible because the 
necessary strict regulations and data protection laws could not be implemented. 
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They may even shift to an "optimistic access control", following the Estonia 
example7: Here, many actors in the health ecosystem have access to the data, 
but the access is registered and can be challenged if necessary.  
3. The public agencies can run analyses on a data set exceeding their own data 
resources. A self-sovereign data scheme integrated into the Cardossier platform 
ensures compliance with regulation and data law.  
 
f) Incentive for making goods public: In many cases, the first five roles provide strong 
incentives to include public agencies in blockchain Consortia. Thus, it is no surprise that 
in many blockchain consortia the public agencies take over (or are lured into, as in the 
Cardossier project) the platform orchestrator role (e.g., in land registries (Ziolkowski et 
al. 2018)). But their participation comes at a cost for the private agencies: In Switzerland, 
there is a requirement in the Swiss constitution to treat all equally; thus, public agencies 
can only participate in blockchain consortia that are open to all Swiss stakeholders and 
this is best implemented in a non-profit association. The case of the Cardossier shows 
that the participation of public agencies in blockchain consortia in many senses 
'socializes' blockchain platforms (i.e., makes them a public good). While this may have 
the additional benefit of taming the 'wild west' methods characterizing many markets 
for digital goods, it may also remove the incentives to participate in creating and running 
a joint platform. Architecture design (in the case of the Cardossier: allowing private 
DApps on a consortium blockchain) and governance design have to counter this threat. 
 
7 https://nortal.com/blog/blockchain-healthcare-estonia/ 
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Thus, blockchain platforms allow new ways to create suitable compromises between the 
diverging public and private interests discussed in the literature (see Susha et al. 2018).  
 
The combination of these six roles explains why public agencies are not just "nice-to-
have" partners in blockchain platforms, but rather they are key players. They are maybe 
even more powerful in this case than in the cases discussed in previous literature (Susha 
et al. 2018): In the Cardossier project, they shaped the nature of the platform and 
became president over its non-profit core.  
6 Conclusions and Limitations  
There is a history of public-private partnerships in infrastructure development and 
maintenance as well as in IT infrastructure development and data sharing. Many 
regulatory, organizational, data, and social issues discussed in the literature also apply 
to blockchain consortia. So, what is novel in the case of the Cardossier? A first novelty is 
the nature of the Cardossier as a multisided platform, connecting public agencies, 
private companies from the car ecosystem, software companies, and private car-
owners. A second novelty is the distributed ledger it is built upon. It allows a more fine-
granular approach to data sharing and new ways of governance. 
 
The Cardossier case offers public agencies a clear understanding of the role they play in 
blockchain consortia: They have a key role not only as a data provider and participant in 
important interorganizational processes, but also as a source of trust and a guarantor of 
data quality. Creating public goods by participating in a multisided platform may be a 
new approach to public governance.  
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When the Cardossier project started, there were quite a few competing projects from 
private startup companies proposing ICOs. Many of them don’t exist anymore. So 
blockchain startup companies can learn from the case of the Cardossier that it is 
advisable to closely study the ecosystem they are trying to change. If they ignore 
important public agencies, they will likely fail. If they involve important public agencies, 
the nature of their undertaking is changing: Startup companies will have to orchestrate 
an ecosystem that can benefit a lot from the participation of public agencies, but they 
will have to care about the special expectations of public agencies, i.e., the platform will 
be different than the centralized and powerful Google or Facebook. It will rather (at least 
partially) be a public good with distributed data and power.  
 
Researchers can learn what it means to involve public agencies in blockchain platforms: 
Involving public agencies forces the platform to operate within a legal and social system. 
This is in contrast to the libertarian roots of the blockchain in Bitcoin (Nakamoto (2008). 
This makes consortium and platform governance both more difficult and easier: It makes 
them more difficult, because the legal and social system put constraints on what is 
acceptable, and it makes them easier, because the legal and social system allow ways to 
incentivize and control the behavior of the actors.  
 
However, this research comes with limitations. We study just one case in detail, and this 
case is situated within the specific legal and social system of Switzerland. It allowed to 
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make the first steps without changing laws8. Other countries with different legislation 
may not offer the same opportunities for the involvement of public agencies. For 
example, in the US, much car-related data is published by government agencies and 
privacy legislation is less strict. Therefore, the private company Carfax, can offer some 
of the information packages to the car owners that the Cardossier strives to provide. 
Thus, there is ample opportunity for researchers to study how public-private consortia 
collaborate to create a joint platform using blockchains.  Furthermore, the empirical 
basis of this study is sub-optimal in the sense that many observations cannot be 
systematically traced back. This is a compromise engaged scholars have to make in such 
a sensitive environment, but we would wish for more systematic research validating our 
observations. And finally, the Cardossier platform is not yet live. Proof-of-concept 
prototypes have been developed, proof-of-value has been demonstrated for many 
stakeholders, and we made a first successful step to proof-of-use by creating the 
Cardossier Association as a hub for a self-sustaining community of users. Go-live is 
scheduled for 2020. We are looking forward to further insights in the research journey.  
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